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I used to think of the connection between a particular and a universal that it
instantiates as a contingent one. Now I think that this is not quite right. This
revision, as I now see it, is not a very large one. I still think that the states of
affairs (Russell’s facts in his great Lectures on Logical Atomism) that unite
particulars and universals are contingent beings. But the connection within
states of affairs is, in a certain way, necessary.
It is useful to start from the position of David Lewis regarding the possibility of
particulars lacking some property that they actually have, and/or having some
property that they actually lack. He asserts that in this situation there is a
counterpart particular in another possible world. One might think of that
counterpart particular as his suggested truthmaker for the modal truths
associated with this possibility, though I am not sure that Lewis would have
agreed with this. But what he always insisted on, I think perfectly correctly, is
that the counterpart is not identical with the actual particular. What I think this
shows is that there is a sense in which all the properties of a particular are
necessary to that particular, and, furthermore, that it is impossible that the
particular have any further properties.
This is not a very big deal. Many metaphysicians hold to this view. For
instance, there is a perfectly respectable theory (though I reject it) that a
particular is just a bundle of universals (Russell’s view in his later years). It is
clear, is it not, that if you ‘add’ and/or ‘subtract’ from this bundle then you have
a different bundle? This should not flutter too many dovecots. The same
should be said of my theory, a more orthodox line than Russell’s, which
accepts that there is, besides the universals, an irreducible particularity
involved in the nature of particulars. As a one worlder, I’d reject other-worldly
counterparts. But we ought, I think, to have a theory of counterparts. We
should think of the counterparts as in our own actual world, the only one that
there is. You are a contingent being. Instead of you there might have been a
person a little bit different. Think of it as ‘annhilation and replacement,’ to get a
picture. The replacement is not you, it is only a counterpart of you. And, just
as Lewis thought, there might have to be minor miracles, that is, minor failures
of laws, to allow of ‘replacing’ you but not altering your environment.
But one vital distinction that we should now introduce is that between
relational and non-relational (intrinsic, as some say) properties. It is only the
non-relational properties of particulars that ‘belong’ to the particular. These
non-relational properties are, I think, a sort of part or constituent, though not
an ordinary part. They ‘divide’ the object in an unusual way. Where a
particular has a plurality of these non-relational properties, these properties
‘divide’ particulars in a manner that is orthogonal to a division into ordinary
parts. Notice that Lewis would have to treat a ‘change’ in your relational
properties as a change to a counterpart, because the unaltered you would
have to be in a different world from the actual world, and he allowed no
identity of particulars across worlds. But I don’t think us one-worlders have to
follow him here. If your intrinsic (non-relational) properties remain unaltered,
but a counterfactual change in a relational property is envisaged, you would
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replacing’ would take place elsewhere in our world. Of course, the ‘change’
might make you somewhat different – you might have reacted differently, and
that would indeed involve going to a counterpart. But a certain electron jump
on Sirius going a different way from the way it actually went might not have
changed you a bit.
This does invite us to consider the point that particulars can change their
properties, their non-relational properties, over time. Am I then not committed
to saying that at each change, negative or positive, we have a different
particular? There may be particulars that never change their properties over
the time during which they exist. Perhaps this holds for the basic constituents
of the world, whatever they are. But ordinary things can certainly change their
non-relational properties. What do I make of these changes? I’m inclined to
bite the bullet and do an ‘outSmarting’, to use the technical term introduced
by Dan Dennett in his Philosophical Lexicon. There is a clear sense, I think, in
which changing things are never the same thing. But there is a relaxed sense
in which we are happy for practical purposes to accept certain space-time
worms as the career of ‘one thing’. The marks of such continuity are not
merely spatio-temporal continuity and a considerable degree of resemblance
in adjoining portions of temporal parts, but, most importantly, I think, causal
relations. I agree with Russell, again in his later period, that what we call
continuing things are certain causal lines.
Going back to the main line of the argument, in recent work I’ve suggested
that the particularity of a particular can be thought of as a one that runs
through the properties of the particular (its non-relational properties only, I
should have emphasized) and so constitutes them a particular. A very simple
particular may have one property only, but there must be one, I think. But
universals are quite different from particulars. At one point I made what strikes
me now as a rather crazy move.1 Just as the properties of a particular are
fixed (at a fixed time) so that to consider the possibility of their having a
different set of non-relational properties is to move to counterparts, so, I
suggested there, to consider the possibility of a universal instantiated by a
different set of particulars from the set it actually instantiates, is to consider a
different or counterpart universal. Later I took this back.2 Particulars and
universals, I said, are different in this respect. Stephen Mumford, however,
says that “this response looks ad hoc and an unconvincing retreat to a
halfway position that will satisfy no one”.3 Nevertheless, it is the one that I now
hold.
Consider that particulars and universals, though necessarily united in first
order states of affairs, are really very different categories of being. (And it is
worth remembering that first-order states of affairs are themselves particulars,
this being what I call ‘the victory of particularity’.) My argument here has been
1 How do Particulars stand to Universals? In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol.1, ed. Dean
Zimmerman, 139–154, 2004, p.144.
2 Reply to Simons and Mumford, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83, (2005), pp. 271-276,
see p. 274.
3 In his David Armstrong, Chesham, Ashgate, 2007, p.191.
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‘fixed’ in the sense that contemplating any difference in these properties is
moving to a mere counterpart. But considering possibilities about particulars,
often not knowing whether the possibility asserted did not or will not manifest
itself, is something we are doing all the time. And even where we know what
happened to a person or other particular we are extremely ready to consider
what might have happened, though it did not. ‘If he had not been cut off in his
prime, he might have done so much’. Possibility, along with probability, is not
just the guide of life as Hume said (truly), it also guides much thought. But we
do not have the same attitude to universals (and more generally properties)
that we do to particulars. We don’t generally contemplate changes in
universals. We don’t very often propose counterfactuals that involve
universals being different universals from the way they actually are. Such a
move may seem rather silly.
So I believe that, although I do not know how to refute the idea that any
contemplated change in its instantiations makes a universal a mere
counterpart of the universal it was, I do not have to accept this proposition. I
think I can draw a distinction between particulars and universals in this
respect. Counterpart theory is for particulars only.
With this in place, I can continue to defend the same general metaphysical
position that I outlined in the book A World of States of Affairs.4 I’ve got some
other small revisions, but won’t bother about them here. For now I wish to
defend myself against what seems to be the most worrying line of criticism
that has been developed in recent years by a number of fellow
metaphysicians, which is that the system is irredeemably flawed by its
quidditism.
I think that the weakness, if it is a weakness, is most clear in my account of
the laws of nature. My idea – the Dretske, Tooley, Armstrong idea (DTA) --
was that the laws link universals in a special way, in a way not envisioned by
the Humean scheme due to Mill, Ramsey and David Lewis. I think the idea is
shown most perspicuously if it is seen as linking states of affairs in a special
way. Begin with state of affairs types, which are, as it were, eviscerated states
of affairs. The state of affairs of a’s being F, with F a universal, is of the state
of affairs type: something’s being F. The linking of universals may then be
seen as the linking of states of affairs types. Thus, a nomic link holding
between the universals F and G might take the form something’s being F
nomically ensures that same something being G, with this ensuring being
thought of as a contingent relation between state of affairs types.5 Please
excuse the abstractness and simplicity of the example. A slightly more helpful
example might be something’s being F ensuring that some further something
4 Cambridge University Press 1999.
5 Fundamentally it is causing, but causing at the level of states of affairs types rather than
states of affairs tokens, thus yielding law-like behaviour. It is an hypothesis that states of
affairs types have these causal relations, but it is its explanatory value in explaining the
world’s regularities that recommends it. I think that this higher-level nomic connection enables
me to maintain myself against the best criticism of my position: the critique launched by van
Fraassen.
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particular is a G. We can think of the laws of nature as an organized structure
– a best system – on which all the nomic linkings of states of affairs types
supervene.
I believe, by the way, that this account of laws of nature makes it superior to
the view that properties are particulars, not universals, that they are tropes as
it is often now said, following the terminology of D.C. Williams. The DTA idea
is unavailable to trope theorists, at any rate those trope theorists who do not
identify properties with the powers that will shortly be the object of our
discussion. If you allow direct nomic connection between universals then the
inference from all observed Fs being Gs to all Fs being Gs can be
represented as an inference to the best explanation: being F and being G are
directly connected.6 By the way, it seems to me that any decent metaphysics
ought to give us some reasonable intellectual handle on the problem of
induction. I’d say also that the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis approach to laws and
causes completely fails this test – as Hume already saw.
But, of course, an assault has been launched on this sort of theory based on
the contingency of these contingent ‘connections between universals’ – to use
the convenient shorthand for causal connections between states of affairs
types. If the connections are contingent, then it is possible that the very same
universals might be differently nomically connected with each other. This
leads us, say critics, to look at the universals more closely. If they are to
remain the same (and how could a universal not remain the same?) then they
must have a nature, a quiddity as it is said, that could survive linking up with
other universals in ways that differ from its actual links. But this quiddity is
immensely unattractive. It looks rather like Locke’s substance, ‘something I
know not what’, which Locke thinks he has to postulate, although he cannot
say what it is.
To get away from quiddity, one can instead move to the position that the laws
of nature are not, after all, contingent, but are necessary. The universals from
their own intrinsic nature dictate what happens in causation and nomic
connection generally. To remain in this position without further explanation,
however, seems to land one with a heap of necessary connections of an
unexplained sort. Necessary connections must, after all, not be postulated
beyond necessity. It is here, however, that the critics of contingent nomic
connections have come up with a very interesting move. It is to construe the
properties involved as powers, as powers to bring about a certain result in a
certain situation. Suppose this is the way to construe properties. Then you
would get a necessary connection with the result (or a necessary connection
with a certain probability of the result if the result is not deterministic) and the
necessity is explained in a simple, and even beautiful, manner. This turning to
the powers is one of the most dramatic returns to the past that analytical
6 See my What is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p.55,
and John Foster, The Divine Lawmaker: Lectures on Induction, Laws of Nature, and the
Existence of God, Oxford University Press, especially p.41.
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philosophers poured on such notions as ‘dormitive virtues’ became a suspect
and superficial scorn. Perhaps Molière’s joke, a joke that generations of
students were introduced to, managed to miss something of the utmost
importance.
I do agree that the quidditism argument carries some weight. But I have two
lines of argument to advance against the suggested remedy: a move to
powers. The first argument has as its patron saint the great French general of
the First World War, Marshall Foch. When his generals spoke of the
difficulties made by the weather he said “It rains on the enemy, too”. The
substitution of powers for properties has its own difficulties, difficulties that I
think are rather easy to spell out. My second argument, rather more
controversial, argues that a purged quidditism is available that may at least
blunt the force of the objection from quiddity.
One immediate difficulty that confronts power theorists is deciding whether all
properties (including relations) are to be construed as powers. I think it is the
external relations, that is, relations that are not necessitated by their terms,
that are the ones that cause the difficulty. Causation and the spatio-temporal
relations are the usual examples cited. Causation is clearly not a power, but I
suppose that a power theorist can identify it (though the details may be tricky)
with the actual manifesting of powers. But can such a relation as distance –
intimately involved as it is in the gravitation laws – be a power? It is quite easy
to think of mass as a power. But the power of masses falls off with distance.
Can the distance be also thought of as a contributory, damping down, power?
This sort of consideration has influenced some power theorists, George
Molnar and Brian Ellis are two, to allow two sorts of property or relation. The
spatial relations, in particular, are allowed by them to involve a categorical
element.
This dualism about properties is phenomenologically attractive, but it seems
gravely to compromise the power theory, because it seems to re-introduce
contingency. The attraction is modified by the distance, and the latter is not a
power, it is categorical. Where is the necessity that this categorical relation
operates to yield an inverse square diminution? Is there anything contrary to
reason in the suggestion that this relation might have operated according to
an inverse cube formula? At this point, I think, one begins to see the attraction
of a double-aspect theory of properties, a power side and a categorical side,
for every true property. This theory was held by C.B. Martin for many years.
But that theory is up to its ears in quiddities, so power theorists can’t accept it
as better than contingent connection of universals.
While giving due weight to the insights that motivated this move, while giving
full credit to Molnar and Ellis’s nose for a difference, this dualistic conception
of properties and relations seems gravely to compromise the power theory, at
any rate if the powers are supposed to be purely powers. The distance of
massive bodies clearly contributes to their powers of attracting each other. So
here is a contributing relation that is, on the Molnar-Ellis view, a categorial
universal. Why then is it necessary that the effect produced by the distance
6relation is whatever it is? What would be the ground of this necessary
connection? And if there is this necessary connection, why should there not
be such a categorial ground for all powers? The power theory perhaps has to
return to a double-aspect theory of properties, as Martin suggested.
A more consistent, more thoroughgoing, power theory was that upheld (for a
time only, it appears) by Sydney Shoemaker, who claimed, despite the
phenomenological implausibility of the view, that every property and every
external relation (spatio-temporal relation, in particular, I’d suppose) is a
power and nothing but a power.7 We get a world of particulars, clothed only in
their powers. The theory has an important consequence. Consider what is
involved in the manifestation of a power. Some acted-upon particular
acquires, or in some cases retains, a certain property. But, on the theory
being considered, the manifested properties are nothing but powers. The
world involves particulars swapping powers according to certain rules and that
is all that there is.
I do understand that work is in progress with the aim of showing that such
relations as distance can be conceived as really being concealed powers. But
I call attention here to what seems to me to be a particularly difficult case for
such a pure powers theory of properties. It is a case mentioned by Phil
Dowe.8 A spaceship is far from other bodies and moving under the impetus
given by its own inertia. So what the inertia at any time produces is more
inertia. If the inertia is construed as a mere power, it is a power that produces
more pure inertia power. But what it actually produces is motion. Its earlier
motion produces later motion. Is motion just a power? It looks like an actuality
in the full non-deflationary sense, the sense that is not recognized by the pure
powers theory.
Suppose, though, that such difficulties can be overcome, and that manifesting
of powers is just the acquiring of powers. Is this not objectionably
deflationary? Particulars are always in potency, never in act. I’m not arguing
that the potency is not real, as I have sometimes been represented as doing.
That, of course, would beg the question against the powers theory. But a
theory that doesn’t allow the properties of beings ever to get beyond potency
seems to me to be profoundly suspect. I’m not arguing that there is any
contradiction in the pure powers theory here. I wouldn’t have expected to find
one. Good metaphysics is not like that. I’ll will just remark, though, that there
seem to be no contradictions in quidditist theories either.
What is a pure power, a power without anything categorial, without any
quiddity? It is possessed by a particular, a, but it is in itself, very
schematically, an ‘if a is F, then G’, where F is a suitable trigger if it comes to
be instantiated in a suitable situation, and G is some sort of outcome. F and
G, of course, involve nothing but pure powers also. Now, could such
metaphysical promissory notes wholly constitute the being of the properties of
7 See Sydney Shoemaker, Causality and properties, in his Identity, Cause and Mind:
Philosophical Essays, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1984.
8 See Phil Dowe, Physical Causation (Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and
Decision Theory), Cambridge University Press, 2000, Chapter 3.
7a? Let me for the sake of argument grant that the powers exist. But ought they
not have something more to them? Quiddities may be too much. But the pure
powers seem to be too little. They seem too abstract in their being to be
decent ontological postulates.
So I suggest that quiddities may actually be the better poison.9 One thing I
object to is the trying to boost the anti-quiddity argument by claiming that I am
committed to saying that there will be the same universals but different laws in
different worlds.10 I’d deny there are other worlds where there are other laws.
I’d say that universals are linked in a certain way to give certain laws as a
matter of fact. Other linkages are pure supposition, elevating a metaphysical
possibility – a mere possibility – into a serious alternative.
At this point we might go back to the position that Martin started from. On that
dualist or double-aspect view, each property has an inner side – a quiddity
one might say – and an outer side, a power side. One thereby gets a
necessary connection between power and manifestation. But it would seem
that contingency would break in again when we consider the two sides of a
property, or else we would get a very opaque necessity. Martin has relatively
recently suggested an Identity Theory for the two sides. The quiddity and the
power are really identical, but are seen differently, like the Necker cube (his
analogy).11 But how does this solve the problem? If the quiddity is the power,
and the power is the quiddity, then they are the same nature differently
perceived (like the cube case). How, for instance, does this differ from the
theory advanced by Shoemaker? Is there something more to powers than
there is for Shoemaker? If not, then there seems to be no difference from the
Shoemaker theory. But if the powers are more meaty, as it were, then does
this not resurrect the two-sided theory? And if we concentrate instead on the
quiddity side, then how can they be strictly identical with powers? There
seems to be an attempt to have it both ways, postulating an identity between
things that are clearly different. (The situation is quite different from the
Identity theory of mind and brain, where topic-neutral descriptions of the
mental can be given – Jack Smart was the hero here – into which a brain
theory can be plugged.) The challenge to Martin, I think, is to say what he is
adding to the pure power theory. Wouldn’t it have to be some quiddity? What
else could it be?
So the rain falls on the powers theory of properties just as much as it falls on
the quiddity theory. I’d say, indeed, that power theories are in more trouble
than quiddity theory. And I’ll now offer a quiddity theory which I hope removes
some (but certainly not all) the objections to quiddities. First for some stage
setting. Universals differ in their -adicities (apologies for the terminology).
9“Go see what the boys in the backroom will have, and give them the poison they name”, See
what the boys in the back room will have, lyrics by Frank Loesser, from Destry Rides Again.
10 See eg Alexander Bird "The Regress of Pure Powers?" Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2007)
513-34.
11 See Martin’s contribution to D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin, U.T. Place and T. Crane (eds),
Dispositions: a Debate (London, Routledge, 1996).
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universal is n-adic in one instantiation, then it is n-adic in all instantiations. It is
of the essence of universals to be strictly identical in different instantiations.
But the -adicity of a universal is surely an intrinsic property of the universal (I
don’t know if ‘property’ is the right word), which it cannot lose on pain of being
a different universal.13
But going back to universals, consider two different universals having the
same –adicity. (Monadic, perhaps.) And let the two universals both be simple
universals, which allows us to take different universals of the same –adicity
and having the same structure – in this limiting case, no structure. Just by
being different, the two universals are numerically different. My suggestion is
that this difference is enough. They have no other difference. That is what
constitutes their quiddities. You can see at once how this makes quiddities
much less like icebergs with a mysterious seven-eighth unobservable beneath
the water. Quiddities become easier to live with because they are less
ontologically expensive. There are, of course, complex universals, often
involving structure (the methane molecule). But their constituent relations and
so on will be constituted by simple universals and these simple universals, if
they agree in their –adicities, will differ numerically only.
This suggestion was presented here on the assumption that complex
universals have simple universals as their ultimate constituents, and this,
though it seems to me to be likely, may (epistemic ‘may’) turn out to be false.
There may be ‘structure all the way down’ or, to put it more generally,
complexity all the way down. How does this affect my proposal for taming
quiddities? Not greatly, I hope. The assumption of simple universals (but
perhaps of varying –adicities) underlying every complex universal helps us to
understand my proposal – simpler cases are easier to grasp. But even if a
universal is infinitely complex, it can still be argued, if my suggestion is right,
that there could be a plurality of universals having the same –adicity and the
same infinite internal structure as each other,
Of course, this attempt to tame quiddity still allows the quiddity objection to be
raised, and I concede that the criticism has still some weight. Some law
involving a plurality of universals, say U1 and U2 and U3 (organized in states of
affairs types), and having the same –adicity and structure, would allow the
possibility that the ‘position’ of the Us in nomic structures be shuffled around
without involving any other change in the order of nature. But notice that it is a
mere possibility. As I have noted, some opponents of quidditism try to
strengthen the argument by saying that the shuffling around is found in other
possible worlds. But that will not impress us one-worlders. The shufflings
around are, we think, mere possibilities.
12 The same can be said for tropes. Perhaps not much here depends on the universals/tropes
dispute. It would be a nice simplification, by the way, if our ontology did not need to go
beyond the dyadic universal or dyadic trope.
13 The same goes, again, for tropes. Tropes of a different –adicity would not resemble exactly,
but exact resemblance is required for those classes of exactly resembling tropes that trope
theorists use as – quite good - substitutes for universals. But tropes, or at any rate tropes that
are not powers, give us no help with the problem of induction.
9I’m not saying that quidditism is not a burden to bear. But see how hard it
rains on the enemy too.
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